

DS/AI for Incident Response & Threat Hunting with CHRYSALIS & DAISY

Jess Garcia

One eSecurity – Founder
SANS – Senior Instructor

jess@one-esecurity.com -  @j3ssgarcia

ODSC
WEST 2022

\$ Whoami



Jess Garcia
@j3ssgarcia



**Founder and CEO of One eSecurity
+25 years of experience in CybSec / DFIR**



**Global DFIR company for 15 years
www.one-esecurity.com**



**Leader of the DS4N6 Project since 2020
www.ds4n6.io**



**Senior Instructor at the SANS Institute
~ 20 years**

Our Objective

Transform you into AI-Enhanced Threat Hunters/Forensicators to bring the power of AI in your day to day investigations.

You do not need to be an AI expert, you will need **to learn what AI can do for you**, becoming familiar with the tools available and how to use them to suit their needs.



The Big Question

AI is great. But, what can it do for a
Threat Hunter / Forensicator?
Would it be able to detect
Cobalt Strike?
What else can it do?



ML FOR DFIR USE CASES

Where Can We Use Machine Learning in DFIR?




DF



TH - CHRYSALIS



CTI



Memory Analysis – Columbo



Malware – Malware Revealer





Logs - Deeplog



Network - Zeek

ML & TH: Artifact Anomalies

Scheduled Tasks	Scheduled Tasks
No time sequence	Time sequence is important
Vanilla Autoencoder	LSTM Autoencoder





ds4n6.io/rsac21

	level_0	Orig_Index	EventID_	AtName_	TaskName_	AtUserID_	ResultCode_	ActionName_	UserNC_	Hostname_
0	676274	676473	140	TaskUpdated	Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\system\$	mc80-sc-7813
1	676273	676472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
2	670275	670474	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\TratarTrazas	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null\scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560	
3	670273	670472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\SyncFolder	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null\scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560	
4	670271	670470	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\RestartDocpath	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null\scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560	
5	676275	676474	200	ActionStart	Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	C:\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCac...	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
6	666222	666421	140	TaskUpdated	Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null\d4_null\swt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106	
7	665394	665593	140	TaskUpdated	Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null\d4_null\swt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106	

ML & Malware: Detection and Classification

Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)




<https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/the-rise-of-deep-learning-for-detection-and-classification-of-malware/>

ML & Malware: Malware Revealer

Malware detection using ML with pre-trained models

Uses SqueezeNet and Logistic Regression models

Extracts features using convolutional filters to classify them as malware



<https://www.ayoub-benaissa.com/blog/malware-revealer/>

ML & Memory Forensics: Columbo

Used to identify specific patterns in compromised datasets

It uses Volatility 3 outputs applying ML algorithms to look for suspicious

You can use it with pslist, psscan, pstree, malfind, netscan, etc.



```
Information about process Number 3496

Possible process path or execution: C:\Users\Bob\AppData\Local\Temp\rad93398.tmp\UmkpjfjDzM.exe

Machine Learning model classifies C:\Users\Bob\AppData\Local\Temp\rad93398.tmp\UmkpjfjDzM.exe to be suspicious. Please consider its percentage scores shown below:
0 1
15.1 84.9

Process traceability coupled with time executions of each process

process UmkpjFjDzM.exe(3496)/2019-03-22-05:35:33.000000 executed by
mscript.exe(5116)/2019-03-22-05:35:32.000000 <- hfs.exe(3952)/2019-03-22-05:34:51.000000 <- explorer.exe(1432)/2019-03-22-05:32:07.000000 root process is 1308

3496 is a parent process of the following process(es):
ImageFileName PPID PID
cmd.exe 3496 4660
```

ML & Logs: Deeplog

It learns from tagged data to classify as anomaly or normal entry

It helps to identify anomalies, using LSTM in large volumes of system logs

Used in IDS/Firewall logs to detect DDoS and Port scans

```
(deeplog_env) ds4n6@daisy:~/Downloads/deeplog_tests$ sh train.sh
[Epoch 1/10] average loss = 8.0148 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:04.2
[Epoch 2/10] average loss = 8.0144 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:03.6
[Epoch 3/10] average loss = 8.0140 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:03.8
[Epoch 4/10] average loss = 8.0136 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:03.0
[Epoch 5/10] average loss = 8.0132 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.6
[Epoch 6/10] average loss = 8.0128 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.5
[Epoch 7/10] average loss = 8.0124 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.8
[Epoch 8/10] average loss = 8.0120 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.8
[Epoch 9/10] average loss = 8.0116 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:04.8
[Epoch 10/10] average loss = 8.0112 ##### (100.00%) runtime 0:00:02.9
```

ML & Network Traffic: Zeek

Customized in-depth monitoring far beyond the capabilities of traditional systems

Perform clustering to find anomalies, setting apart outliers

We can find threats in large data sets even when they're unknown



David Hoelzer. Author of:

- **SEC503:** *Intrusion Detection In-Depth.*
- **SEC595:** *Applied Data Science and AI/Machine Learning for Cybersecurity Professionals.*

Threat Hunting: Old Data New Tricks!

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCTz62fN8OA>

Applying Machine Learning to Network Anomalies:


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOfgNd-qijl>

ML & DF: Elastic

The Elastic Observability and Security solutions have preconfigured machine learning models

The screenshot displays the Elastic Anomaly Explorer interface. At the top, the breadcrumb navigation shows 'Machine Learning / Anomaly Detection / Anomaly Explorer'. The main header includes tabs for 'Overview', 'Anomaly Detection', 'Data Frame Analytics', and 'Data Visualizer'. A date range selector is set to 'Apr 30, 2020 @ 23:47:20.03' to 'Jun 5, 2020 @ 06:00:00.00'. Below this, the 'Job Management' section shows the selected job 'dns_data_steal_detectionv2'. A filter is applied: 'Filter by influencer fields... (destination.ip : 10.4.1.244)'. The interface is divided into several sections: 'Top Influencers' for 'destination.ip' (listing 10.4.1.244 with a count of 15), 'host.name' (listing test-env-... with a count of 16), and 'dns.question.etld_plus_one' (listing dnsTunneling.bad with a count of 15). An 'Anomaly timeline' chart shows a significant spike on May 29, 2020. Below the timeline, a table of anomalies is displayed with columns for time, severity, detector, found for, influenced by, actual, typical, and description. The detected anomaly is a 'warning' from the 'dnsTunneling.bad' detector, found for 'destination.ip: 10.4.1.244', with an actual value of 66873 and a typical value of 29.10034686446426. The description notes 'More than 100x higher'. A 'Host Details' popup is visible for the host 'test-env-...'. The 'Severity threshold' is set to 'warning' and the 'Interval' is 'Auto'.

ML & DF: Elastic – Use Case: DNS Exfiltration



time	severity ↓	detector	found for	influenced by	actual	typical	description
334				beat.hostname: HR02			
118				beat.hostname: NETWORK_TAP			
93	> April 8th 2020	88	covertc2.com	highest_registered_domain: covertc2.com	158140	17.24000160332901	More than 100x higher
222							
71							



ML on the Cloud: MSTICPy and Azure



<https://github.com/microsoft/msticpy>

<https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel>

DS4N6

Putting All Together: DS4N6

Mission: Bring Data Science & Artificial Intelligence to the fingerprints of the average Forensicator and promote advances in the field

Presented in

ds4n6.io




Since 2020



DS4N6: The Road So Far

DS4N6

ds4n6.io



CHRYSALIS

D4ML

HAM

**ADversAry
eMulator**

Daisy VM

CHRYSALIS

Python framework that provides DS/ML functions to use without any specific DS/ML knowledge

Complete your investigations with only 7 functions!

i
More information in:
www.ds4n6.io/chrysalis

CORE FUNCTIONS

Function	Usage	Type	Description
whatis()	whatis(obj)	CLI	Identifies the forensic data type of an object (DataFrame -df- or DataFrame Collection -dfs-)
xread()	xread(options)	GUI	Reads tool output data (e.g. plaso output) and stores it in a df/dfs
xmenu()	xmenu(obj)	GUI	Used to easily select a dataframe from dfs, or a column from a df, displaying the selected data and allowing manual (Excel-like) analysis on it
xanalysis()	xanalysis(obj, options)	GUI	Displays a menu with the advanced analysis functions available for the data type (i.e. forensic artifact) given
xdisplay()	xdisplay()	GUI	Used to select the display settings for the dataframes that will be displayed (max. rows, max. columns, etc.)
simple()	df.simple(options)	CLI	Simplifies forensic output (df) showing only the most interesting columns for analysis.
xgrep()	xgrep(obj, options)	CLI	UNIX-like grep for the DataFrame world. Allows the user to search for a regular expression in a DF column or full DF

Try CHRYSALIS on the Cloud: Colab & Binder

ODSC_TheStolenSzechuanSauceCase.ipynb

File Edit View Insert Runtime Tools Help Cannot save changes

Share Settings DS

RAM Disk Editing

Table of contents

- 1.2 Understanding of Evidence
- 1.3 Using DataFrames to View Evidence
- 1.4 Simple() Function
- 1.5 CONCLUSIONS:
- 2. SUCCESSFUL LOGON ANALYSIS
 - 2.1 Windows Events
 - 2.2 Windows Security Events
 - 2.3 plaso_get_evtxdfs() Function
 - 2.4 xanalysis() Function
 - 2.5 CONCLUSIONS:
- 3. CLOSER LOOK INTO DOMAIN CONTROLLER LOGONS
 - 3.1 Suspicious Logons
 - 3.2. Checking Failed Logons
 - 3.3 CONCLUSIONS:
- 4. FAILED LOGONS
 - 4.1. Matplotlib
 - 4.2. Failed Logons Analysis**
 - 4.3. CONCLUSIONS:
- 5. LOOKING INTO THE FSTL & AUTORUNS
 - 5.1 Filesystem Timeline

+ Code + Text Copy to Drive

xanalysis(secevtxdfsrv)

Analysis explorer:

Analysis object: DataFrame Analysis type: evtx DF to analyze: 4625

Available analysis types: Failed Logons info Export Result to d4.out

Failed Logons

Timestamp

0s completed at 1:48 PM

Try Colab now:
bit.ly/3Ff2V0m




Try Binder now:
bit.ly/3Ff2V0m



D4ML

Easy-to-use ML functions that you can apply to your artifact dataframes.
It can be implemented stand-alone or via xanalysis()



find_anomalies()
D4ML function to find anomalies
via ML without knowing ML

More information in:
www.ds4n6.io/d4ml

	level_0	Orig_Index	EventID_	AtName_	TaskName_	AtUserID_	ResultCode_	ActionName_	UserNC_	Hostname_
0	676274	676473	140	TaskUpdated	\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\system\$	mc80-sc-7813
1	676273	676472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	None	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
2	670275	670474	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\TratarTrazas	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
3	670273	670472	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\SyncFolder	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
4	670271	670470	106	TaskRegisteredEvent	\RestartDocpath	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	scpd02mq01\adm_sna	xwt70-sf-2560
5	676275	676474	200	ActionStart	\Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\...	S-1-5-18	None	C:\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCac...	d4_null\rice.berav\$	mc80-sc-7813
6	666222	666421	140	TaskUpdated	\Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	d4_null\xwt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106
7	665394	665593	140	TaskUpdated	\Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improve...	S-1-5-18	-64646464	d4_null	d4_null\xwt70-sf-9087\$	mc80-sc-6106

HAM / HAMML

Model that harmonizes the output of different tools so the underlying artifact data has the same format regardless of the tool that generated it

Tools

- Kansa
- Kape
- Plaso
- Mactime
- Autoruns
- Macrobbber
- Volatility

Artifacts

- SvsList
- Amcache
- Pslist
- Evtx
- Flist
- Winreg
- Fstl



More information in:
www.ds4n6.io/ham

HAMML: HAM + Feature Selection + Feature Engineering

HAM / HAMML

Unharmonized
DataFrame

xread()

Harmonized
DataFrame

```
[10]: plaso_JSON.head()
```

```
[10]:
```

	event_0	event_1	event_2	event_3	event_4	event_5	event_6
__container_type__	event	event	event	event	event	event	event
__type__	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer	AttributeContainer
build_number	9600	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN	NaN
data_type	windows:registry:installation	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry	windows:shell_item:file_entry
date_time	{ '__class_name__': 'PosixTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues', 'timestamp': 0}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}	{ '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}

Statistics:

No. Entries: 72

HIDDEN COLUMNS		CONSTANT COLUMNS	
0	Column		Value
0	__container_type__	0	D4_DataType_ nan
1	__type__	1	D4_Orchestrator_ nan
2	data_type	2	D4_Tool_ plaso
3	inode	3	D4_Plugin_ windows_shell_item_file_entry
4	parser	4	D4_Hostname_
5	pevtnum	5	date_time { '__class_name__': 'FATDateTime', '__type__': 'DateTimeValues'}
6	message	6	hostname DESKTOP-SDN1RPT
7	sha256_hash		
8	pathspec		

Timestamp_	timestamp_desc	display_name	file_reference	filename	long_name	name	origin	shell_item_path	timestamp	localized_name	pathspec_simple_
0	2019-12-07 09:03:46	Creation	NTFS:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat	\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat	Windows	Windows	HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\16	<My Computer> C:\Windows	1575709426000000	<NA>	[p3]\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat

ADAM

ADAM allows you to define a sequence of malicious artifact data and inject it in a dataframe to test the detection capabilities

The DS ADversAry eMulator

Mimick real attacks

Inject events in multiple Artifact-specific Dataframes

Creates a “Virtual” DataFrame environment



More information in:
www.ds4n6.io/adam

DAISY

Ready-to-use DS Virtual Machine designed to carry out Data Science and Machine/Deep Learning Analysis on DFIR data



	DFIR	
Data	D	
	A	Artificial
	I	Intelligence
Science	S	
	Y	



i
More information in:
www.ds4n6.io/daisy

DAISY

Forensics tools

RegRipper

<http://github.com/keydet89>



VOLATILITY



The Sleuth Kit
DIGITAL FORENSIC TOOL



timesketch
Digital Forensics Timeline Analysis

DS4N6



CHRYSALIS

ML/DS tools



eland




jupyterlab



pandas

Ready to use notebooks




Forensic demo data



Ali Hadi

DAISY



Detecting CONTI with ML

Based on real events

The Big Challenge

Would we be able to detect
Cobalt Strike
by just using
Machine Learning?

Let's try!



Use Case: Cobalt Strike Detection

Platform for Red Teams operations and adversary simulations

3rd most common threat (Red Canary)

Beacons: Post exploitation payloads

Malleable C2: language to give control over the indicators in the Beacon payload

THREAT

Cobalt Strike


Cobalt Strike continues to be a favorite C2 tool among adversaries, as many rely on its functionality to maintain a foothold into victim organizations.

#3

OVERALL RANK

7.9%

CUSTOMERS AFFECTED





Demo Data

 30 days of **real world production server data**

 **+100** servers

 **+200K** events

 **Cobalt Strike** real events injected with ADAM

 **ML analysis** performed with CHRYSALIS

The Ransomware Attack



Global Company

The attack could spread



CONTI

TOP Threat Actor from Russia
using Cobalt Strike



Worldwide Scope

5k Servers + 350 DCs + 12k Laptops

The Breach. Day 0



SOC Alert!



**Pre-Ransomware
tools found**



5 infected hosts



5 days since intrusion



Possibly spread

Detecting The Enemy

We will detect the intrusion in different phases



Detecting Cobalt Strike with prefetch

TA0001: Initial Access
T1078.003: Malicious Logons

TA0003: Persistence
T1053.005: Scheduled Tasks

TA0005: Defense Evasion
T1218: System Binary Proxy Execution

ID: T1078.003

Sub-technique of: T1078

- ① Tactics: Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access
- ① Platforms: Containers, Linux, Windows, macOS
- ① Permissions Required: Administrator, User

Version: 1.2

Created: 13 March 2020

Last Modified: 18 October 2021

ID: T1053.005

Sub-technique of: T1053

- ① Tactics: Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
- ① Platforms: Windows
- ① Permissions Required: Administrator
- ① Supports Remote: Yes

Contributors: Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas; Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell; Selena Larson, @selenalarson; Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML

Version: 1.1

Created: 27 November 2019

Last Modified: 14 April 2022

ID: T1218

Sub-techniques: T1218.001, T1218.002, T1218.003, T1218.004, T1218.005, T1218.007, T1218.008, T1218.009, T1218.010, T1218.011, T1218.012, T1218.013, T1218.014

- ① Tactic: Defense Evasion
- ① Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
- ① Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application control, Digital Certificate Validation

Contributors: Hans Christoffer Gaardl s; Nishan Maharjan, @loki248; Praetorian; Wes Hurd

Version: 3.0

Created: 18 April 2018


Last Modified: 18 April 2022

New Lethal Forensic Technique!



Trinity

TRINITY is One eSecurity's Open XDR, developed by our DFIR experts and used to offer Threat Hunting services to our customers.



Powered with AI
by CHRYSALIS

We are introducing CHRYSALIS AI power into TRINITY for anomalies detection

The screenshot shows the TRINITY v3.0.0 GAIA interface. The top navigation bar includes the 'one esecurity' logo, the product name 'TRINITY v3.0.0 GAIA', and the user 'dcontreras'. A sidebar on the left lists navigation options: Dashboard, Operations, Analysis, CTI, Management, Reports, Settings, About, and Testing. The main content area displays a table of anomalies with columns: Status, Start Date, Finish Date, Channel, Analysis Type, Hosts, and Execution. A single row is visible with the following data: Status: finished, Start Date: 2022-10-04 10:38:33, Finish Date: 2022-10-04 10:39:58, Channel: windows, Analysis Type: gevo_anomalies_evtx_sched_t..., Hosts: 3. Below this is a detailed view titled 'GEVO evtX Scheduled Tasks Top Anomalies at 2022-10-04 10:39:58'. It shows a 'Forest Path' and a table of event details with columns: Anom..., Timestamp_, EventID_, AtName_, TaskName_, AtUserID_, ResultCode_, ActionName_, UserNC_, and Hostname_. The table contains 8 rows of data, including TaskFailureEvent and TaskStartEvent entries.

Graph Analysis
and many other AI
applications are
coming to TRINITY

TRINITY shows the most anomalous scheduled tasks related events for a host

Summary


Machine Learning could enhance the analysis, detection and responses typically performed by forensicators

There are not many open source tools using ML in DF

DS4N6 is an open source project to bring the power of DS and ML to the community: CHRYSALIS, DAISY, etc.

CHRYSALIS and the analysis presented have been used in real world incidents and with FORTUNE 500 customers

Apply





All the details about this talk:
ds4n6.io/odscwest22



DS4N6

- [ds4n6.io](https://www.ds4n6.io)
- [@ds4n6_io](https://twitter.com/ds4n6_io)
- [DS4N6](https://www.youtube.com/DS4N6)

Jess Garcia
[@j3ssgarcia](https://twitter.com/j3ssgarcia)

Thanks!

(one) eSecurity

- [one-esecurity.com](https://www.one-esecurity.com)
- [One_eSecurity](https://twitter.com/One_eSecurity)
- [One eSecurity](https://www.youtube.com/One_eSecurity)